

STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of DEON DONQUEZ CRAFTON,
Minor.

FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

CHANDRA CRAFTON,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

LARRY WORD,

Respondent.

UNPUBLISHED

April 1, 2004

No. 251603

Berrien Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 03-000059-NA

Before: Zahra, P.J., and Saad and Schuette, JJ.

MEMORANDUM.

Respondent appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating her parental rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), (i), (j), and (l). We affirm. This appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).

Respondent has abandoned any challenge to the trial court's findings under § 19b(3)(l) by failing to address the issue in her brief. *Yee v Shiawassee Co Bd of Comm'rs*, 251 Mich App 379, 406; 651 NW2d 756 (2002). Because only one statutory ground is required to support termination of parental rights, this Court may affirm on this basis alone. *In re Trejo*, 462 Mich 341, 360; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).

In any event, we find the trial court did not clearly err in finding that all of the statutory grounds were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(J); *In re Sours*, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999); *In re Miller*, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). It is undisputed that respondent's parental rights to two older children were terminated in a prior child protection proceeding primarily due to her substance abuse issues. The trial court was not required to take judicial notice of the court file in this prior matter, as respondent apparently argues. There was testimony from the previous foster care worker which established that

respondent's two older children were within the jurisdiction of the court, that many services were offered to attempt to rehabilitate respondent, that these services were unsuccessful, and that respondent's parental rights were terminated approximately fifteen months after the children became temporary court wards. Moreover, Deon, the child at issue in this appeal, tested positive for cocaine at birth and was never in the care of respondent. Although respondent had initially entered into substance abuse treatment after Deon was removed, she was later discharged from the program for lack of attendance and was not attending any treatment at the time of the termination hearing.

Further, the evidence did not show that termination of respondent's parental rights was clearly not in the best interests of the child. MCL 712A.19b(5); *In re Trejo*, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Therefore, the trial court did not err in terminating her parental rights to Deon.

Affirmed.

/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Bill Schuette